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Post-con!ict societies which have achieved a cessation of violence and embarked on a political con!ict transformation process cannot in the long-term 
avoid a process of dealing with the past. Case studies of South Africa and Northern Ireland con"rm this normative claim, showing that within the post-war 
society as a whole a social consensus on how to “understand” and “recognize” the use of violence that occurred during the con!ict is necessary: under-
standing the other’s “understanding” of violence. A mutual understanding must be reached that both sides fought a campaign that was just and legitimate 
from their own perspective. The morality of the “other’s violence” has to be recognized.
Understanding the Other’s “Understanding” of Violence: 
Legitimacy, Recognition, and the Challenge of Dealing 
with the Past in Divided Societies
Marcel M. Baumann, Institute of Political Science and Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, University of Freiburg, Germany
1. Introduction
If we don’t live together, we’ll die together. (Bobby 
Philpott, March 7, 2000)1
Bobby Philpott was one of the leading members of the 
Ulster Defence Association (UDA), which is the largest 
Loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland. He was 
directly involved in the peace process as part of the UDA 
delegation that met British Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland during her controversial visit to the Maze prison in 
1998, when Mowlam talked with UDA prisoners to avert a 
crisis in the peace process. Philpott’s statement leads to the 
central question of this essay: How can divided post-con-
9ict societies constructively deal with the past in order to 
rebuild their social fabric in such a way that the con9icting 
ethnopolitical communities (the former enemies) are able to 
live together in peace? In order to answer that question this 
paper will elaborate on the following thesis: for fragile post-
war societies one necessary prerequisite for dealing with the 
violent past is for the society as a whole to seek an empathic 
understanding and recognition of politically motivated 
violence. :e term “recognition” refers to the philosophical 
concept of Axel Honneth who claimed that “the struggle for 
recognition” should be at the center of “social con9icts” (see 
below).
:e methodological approach of discourse analysis of 
violence will be used in order to bring out the core argu-
ment. :e term “discourse” is used in this paper not as a 
mere synonym for “debate” or “discussion,” but to desig-
nate a more advanced form of communication including 
the totality of communicative acts (speech acts) that can 
be analyzed according to their common structures, prac-
tices, rules, resources, and meanings (Keller 2004, 64). :e 
discourse analysis of violence will focus on the strategies 
used by armed groups—like the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA)—to justify or legitimize their acts of violence. Violent 
acts are seen within an interpretative “discourse process” 
:e idea for this article came from a paper entitled 
“Understanding the other’s ‘understanding’ of 
violence: Legitimacy, recognition and the ‘violent’ 
challenge of dealing with the past in post-con9ict 
societies” given by the author at the 49th Annual 
Convention of the International Studies Association 
(“Bridging Multiple Divides”), San Francisco, March 
26–29, 2008. :is was a presentation in the March 
27th panel on “Reassessing the past in divided 
societies: Human rights, memory and reconcili-
ation policies in cross-regional perspectives.”
1 Bobby Philpott, in an interview for the three-
part documentary “Loyalists” produced by 
high-pro=le British journalist Peter Taylor 
and shown on BBC Two on March 7, 2000.
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taking place within the a>ected community. :is process 
aims to legitimize acts of violence in the perception of the 
community so that violence becomes self-a?rmative and 
independent. :e meaning of violence will be the central 
focus of analyzing the discourse on the “morality of vio-
lence” (Hamber 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2003). :e morality of 
violence is expressed through a process of rationalization of 
violent acts, a process that is instrumentalized as a delibera-
tive strategy by the non-state armed groups.
:is article will make the case for a quite contentious nor-
mative argument: Having achieved a cessation of violence 
and embarked on a political con9ict transformation process 
it becomes absolutely vital to reach a social consensus 
within the post-war society on how to recognize and under-
stand the use of violence during the con9ict in moral and 
ethical terms. It is a rather uneasy and uncomfortable chal-
lenge, both for the victims and the perpetrators of violence, 
but a debate that cannot be evaded. :e prerequisite for the 
divided communities being part of the same post-con9ict 
society is to achieve a common, not a divided understanding 
of the violent past in order to move forward: understand-
ing the other’s “understanding” of violence means to reach 
a mutual understanding that both sides fought a campaign 
which from their own perspective was just and legitimate. 
:e morality of the “other’s violence” has to be recognized.
:e viability of that approach becomes obvious if we 
consider the basic need of a divided post-war society. Put 
simply, the communities will have to live together in future 
and cannot risk being divided over the past. :e basic hu-
man needs of the individuals living in them can be iden-
ti=ed using the terminology and concepts of Rosenberg 
(2003a, 2003b, 2004), J. W. Burton (1987, 1990, 1995), Burton 
and Dukes (1990), and Ropers (1995a, 1995b), who focus on 
the “needs” of the con9icting parties as a starting point for 
con9ict transformation processes. According to Norbert 
Ropers, a distinction has to be drawn between con9icts of 
interest and con9icts of identity in the analysis of any eth-
no-political con9ict (1995a). While con9icts of interests can 
in theory be worked out by adjusting the diverging interests 
through more or less “mutual” accommodations, con9icts 
of identity cannot be resolved by accommodation—it is al-
most “all-or-nothing.” For example, the demand for politi-
cal and cultural acceptance by a particular ethnic identity 
is simply non-negotiable (Ropers 1995b, 206). However, an 
e>ective con9ict transformation strategy can be arrived at 
when interests are separated from attitudes and opinions on 
the one hand and from needs on the other hand. Opinions 
are always associated with politically articulated goals, 
for example the demand for secession of territory. :ey 
are basic mindsets and viewpoints, which must be distin-
guished from interests which suggest that certain “motives” 
were the causes of or reasons for ethno-political con9ict. 
A transformation of the con9ict cannot take place if the 
con9ict is understood as a “tragic expression of unsatis=ed 
needs” (Rosenberg 2004, 27). :e same basic assumption is 
made by Kelman, who perceives con9ict as a process driven 
by collective needs and fears (1997, 195). :ese needs are 
primarily of an individual and human nature; however they 
are articulated and demanded through groups which rep-
resent certain interests (ibid.). :e concept focusing on the 
“needs” of the con9icting parties leads to the acceptance of 
an inclusive de=nition of “victim”: there can be no hierarchy 
of victims; no one can claim sole ownership of “victim-
hood” for himself. Rather, everyone who died as a direct or 
indirect consequence of the con9ict should be quali=ed and 
treated as a “legitimate” victim. On that basis societies can 
move forward towards resolving the con9icting “moralities 
of violence” and the contentious “memories” of a divided 
violent past.
Naturally there are important limits to this line of reason-
ing, e.g. there are limits to the demand for understanding 
and recognition. :e following arguments are more or less 
explicitly linked to post-war societies where former enemies 
have to live together. Of course these normative implica-
tions cannot be transferred to all cases where violence 
happened on a massive, organized scale, for example in 
the case of genocide. It is very important to make the point 
that the political nature of violence in divided societies, 
where former enemies have to live together aBer war, is an 
essential requirement for the “understanding approach” 
to violence which is the core of this article. :is line of 
reasoning is based on the notion of “divided societies” that 
perceives post-war societies as being divided by con9icting 
“identities.” :ese divisions already existed before the war 
and continue to shape the post-war society, for example as 
110IJCV : Vol. 3 (1) 2009, pp. 107 – 123Marcel M. Baumann: Understanding the Other’s “Understanding” of Violence
“majority/minority” situations. :is means that although 
any post-war society by its very nature could be regarded 
as “divided”—and we should keep in mind that “ethnicity” 
rarely exists in a pure form, rather it is usually combined 
with factors such as religion, race, or class in mutually 
reinforcing ways—it is important to understand that the 
con9ict-generating cleavages are based on identities that are 
derived from certain ethnic or cultural aspects of “belong-
ing.” In particular, cases like Northern Ireland, Bosnia, 
Nigeria, and the Philippines are examples for this under-
standing of divided societies.
It is precisely the relevance for divided societies which al-
lows the central argument of this article to move beyond 
the purely normative basis of the argument which favors an 
approach of “understanding” of violence. While achieving 
an understanding of the other’s “understanding” of violence 
might indeed be di?cult in the short-term, since it can and 
does open wounds and may even put the post-war society 
at risk of a return to violence, in the longer term every 
post-war society has to =nd a way to deal with the past. :is 
can even be seen in European countries like Spain, where 
the con9ict-generating cleavages are not based on ethnicity 
or race. In the Spanish case an informal “pact of forget-
ting” (pacto de olvido) was established aBer the civil war. 
Although this pact was quite “successful” for seventy years, 
its recent breakdown demonstrates the need for a process 
of dealing with the past in Spain. :is process had been 
“frozen” for seventy years, but the demand never went away: 
the strategy of forgetting could not last forever. According 
to the well-known British historian Antony Beevor, in e>ect 
“two Spains” developed. His new book on the Spanish civil 
war makes a strong case for a process of dealing with the 
past (Beevor 2008). In an interview he emphasized: “:e 
Pact of Forgetting has to be broken. All Spanish citizens—
citizens of one of the most modern and most optimistically 
minded peoples in the European Union—have to learn to 
understand how this tragedy could have happened” (Die 
Zeit, July 17, 2006).
A lot has been written on “dealing with,” “managing,” 
“coping with,” or “overcoming” the past (“delete as ap-
propriate”), and following the South African experience 
(see below) quite a number of “truth commissions” have 
been set up around the world. Priscilla Hayner compared 
=Been truth commissions established world-wide before 
1994 (Hayner 1994, 1995, 2000). In the South African con-
text, however (serving as the prime example), it is highly 
disputed whether the “truth commission” remedy actually 
led to forgiveness and reconciliation. Take this statement 
from Sonny Venkathratnam, a former prisoner on Robben 
Island whose middle ear was removed with a spoon and 
genitals cut o>: “I will never forgive my torturers. Because 
for twenty-four hours a day it reminds me that I’ve been tor-
tured. So, I am not asking for revenge, but don’t ask me for 
forgiveness” (Venkathratnam 2003).
Although there were completely di>erent voices too, Ven-
kathratnam’s statement illustrates the core of the dilemma 
confronted by applied science: What right does “peace sci-
ence” (Baumann 2008a) have to claim or postulate that the 
a>ected societies or communities should forgive or become 
reconciled? What moral and ethical justi=cations allow us 
to tell a su>ering community that it has to recognize the 
other side’s su>ering and to reach a social consensus? :ere 
is no universal remedy in dealing with the past; indeed 
there are ethical constraints and dilemmas which should be 
recognized by peace science, for the “easy” recommenda-
tion of “truth commission,” as it is commonly applied to 
post-war societies, can have serious and counter-productive 
e>ects.
:erefore, the approach taken in this paper is to take a criti-
cal look at the South African case with the aim of trying 
to learn from its successes and failures. Instead of opening 
some magic, universal peace-building toolbox, we might 
identify some basic common features. :e case of South Af-
rica has been chosen because it is internationally hailed as a 
“role model” for truth and reconciliation. In addition to the 
fact that the South African truth and reconciliation process 
led to a series of similar “experiments” around the world, it 
can be argued that with respect to the disputed issue of the 
“moralities of violence,” “recognition” of the political nature 
of violence in South African was the main rationale of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
:erefore, it appears appropriate to compare South Africa 
with Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland can be seen as a 
case where a political peace settlement has been reached 
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but the process of dealing with the past has not started yet. 
And because of that the (short-term) political achievements 
of the Northern Irish peace process might prove irrelevant 
in the long term if the divided communities =nd no way to 
overcome their hostility and learn to live together.
2. Voluntary Apartheid in Northern Ireland:  
Peace-Building through “Chosen Amnesia”?
We are now in a new era in Northern Ireland. It’s 
long past time that people decided they should 
move on and leave the past behind. (Edwin Poots, 
Belfast Telegraph, August 9, 2007)
:is statement was made by Edwin Poots from the British-
Loyalist Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) when he was 
confronted with the necessity of dealing with the past in 
Northern Ireland. Poots became Minister of Culture, Arts, 
and Leisure in the new Northern Ireland executive which 
was formed in May 2007. For the =rst time in the history 
of Northern Ireland the government included the two 
former enemies: the DUP, the most radical Unionist party 
(which strongly supports ties with Great Britain), and Sinn 
Fein, the political wing of the IRA. Although both parties 
were part of the =rst administration until its suspension 
in October 2002, the DUP had never spoken directly with 
Sinn Fein representatives and had consistently refused to 
engage with them in any form. All cabinet meetings of the 
=rst administration were boycotted by the DUP ministers. 
:e new power-sharing government became possible aBer 
the St. Andrews Agreement signed by the British and Irish 
governments in October 2006, which built on the Good 
Friday Agreement of 1998.
:e debate over a truth and reconciliation commission for 
Northern Ireland actually began quite a long time before 
the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. Given the 
historical fact that 1,800 of the almost 4,000 killings since 
1969 have not been solved yet, the community’s desire for 
disclosure has a particular relevance (detailed victim statis-
tics can be found in Smyth and Fay 2000). Norman Porter 
distinguishes two sides which have dominated the North-
ern Irish “reconciliation debate”—the “cynics” and the 
“enthusiasts” (Porter 2003, 13>.). He considers himself one 
of the enthusiasts and argues for an empathetic embrace of 
reconciliation, although it might be di?cult and dangerous 
(21). At the same time, Porter severly criticises the o?cial 
churches and religious leaders for their very limited engage-
ment in reconciliation: “It is a curious thing that many who 
boast the purest Christian motives are among those most 
threatened by the possibility of political reconciliation in 
the North” (Porter 2003, 27).
:e main Protestant churches, for example, proclaimed 
that they would reject a Northern Ireland truth commis-
sion based on the South African model (+e Newsletter, 
May 2, 2004). Porter’s critique is absolutely plausible, since 
in Northern Ireland there is simply not enough strength in 
the political leadership to be able to support or lead a social 
reconciliation process or any institutional process of that 
kind. At the national level, the necessary degree of politi-
cal leadership does not exist. :is is the main di>erence to 
the political leadership in South Africa (M. Burton 1999), as 
witnessed on several occasions: the “Saville Inquiry” into 
the events of Bloody Sunday is a quite obvious example 
showing a lack of political leadership for a process of deal-
ing with the past (see section 4.2.). Martin McGuinness, 
who was Sinn Fein’s chief negotiator during the peace pro-
cess and a leading member of the IRA in the 1970s, was the 
only person with a Republican background to give evidence 
at the inquiry, where he cited a “Republican code of honor” 
that prevented him from giving evidence against fellow 
Republicans. But the British security forces were also more 
than reluctant to come forward: the British government 
has not yet had the courage to start an o?cial, independent 
truth process or even give its consent to an internal body 
dealing with the issue in a completely independent way.
:e British government regularly consulted South African 
politicians and policy-makers. At the end of May 2004, for 
example, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
Paul Murphy, visited South Africa to =nd out what lessons 
could be learned about dealing with a history of violence 
and human rights abuses (BBC News, June 1, 2004, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/3767455.stm). 
Among others, Murphy met with Charles Villa-Vicencio, 
who was the National Research Director of the South Afri-
can Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Villa-
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Vicencio led Murphy to the crucial conclusion that the TRC 
is “not exportable”: “Ultimately it came out of the womb of 
this place. :ey [in Northern Ireland] probably need to =nd 
some way, but I am certainly not suggesting it should be a 
TRC” (Belfast Telegraph, June 2, 2004).
:is conclusion could at the same time be characterized 
as the lowest common denominator in the context of the 
Northern Irish “reconciliation discourse”: the belief that the 
past needs to be dealt with is shared by all political par-
ties and groups, but at the same time all also agree that the 
South African TRC cannot simply be adopted in the form 
of a “Northern Ireland TRC.” :e TRC was part of the de-
mocratization process and a political compromise. :is op-
portunity has already been lost in the negotiations that led 
to the Good Friday Agreement, because the section of the 
Good Friday Agreement addressing the question of victims 
is very abstract and was leB wide open for interpretation.2 
:e agreement established a Victims Commission and the 
position of a Victims Commissioner, to which Kenneth 
Bloom=eld was appointed. Bloom=eld published a report 
(We Will Remember +em) in which the idea of a Northern 
Ireland truth commission was mentioned in very distanced, 
sensitive, and even shy language: “:e possibility of bene=t-
ing from some form of Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion at some stage should not be overlooked” (Bloom=eld 
1998, paragraph 5.37).
At the same time he also emphasized one fundamental 
restriction on a “Northern Irish truth commission”: “Un-
happily, “truth” can be used as a weapon as well as a shield. 
If such a device were to have a place in Northern Ireland, 
it could only be in the context of a wide ranging political 
accord” (38).
In today’s Northern Ireland, in Bloom=eld’s words, “truth” 
would most likely be a weapon. :e overwhelming consen-
sus in this discussion is that Northern Irish society is not 
ready to bear the complete and utter truth of the violent 
past: “Post the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland 
it is clear that a broad level of consensus on the need to un-
cover the past is not forthcoming. It would probably also be 
a mistake to use the structure of the South African model 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a starting 
point for dealing with the past” (Hamber 1999a).
:e main reason for this consensus, as this paper argues, 
can be traced back to the existence of two con9icting mem-
ories of that past that are linked with two contradicting 
moralities of violence: a Protestant and a Catholic “version.” 
:e communal divisions de=ned by these “two versions” 
are still manifest in Northern Ireland’s post-con9ict society. 
:is is especially the case in those areas that were worst 
a>ected by the violence during the “Troubles,” namely the 
working-class areas. It was indeed a “working-class war” 
that had taken place in Northern Ireland.
:e post-con9ict society can be characterized as a situation 
consisting of and based on a chosen “voluntary apartheid” 
(Baumann 2008b). “Voluntary apartheid” as a theory 
includes all relevant endogenous factors governing the post-
war society’s communal divisions. :e underlying assump-
tion of the theory posits that a lasting and secure “peace” 
can only be achieved by the absence of voluntary apartheid; 
since as long as these negative, endogenous structures are 
leB over as virulent factors, the danger of society’s return to 
violence is eminent. :us, the peace process remains fragile. 
In contrast to violently enforced apartheid, the concept of 
“voluntary apartheid” characterizes a deliberately chosen 
ethno-political strategy used by post-war communities to 
uphold community division and separateness. “Voluntary 
apartheid” can also be seen as a critical indicator of society’s 
willingness and ability to enter peaceful con9ict trans-
formation. As an alternative terminology the traditional 
sociological theory of “social closure” could be adopted—in 
the sense of “ethnopolitical closure.” Social closure can be 
traced back to Max Weber: the process leading to “closure” 
is the result of the strategy pursued by each community to 
maximize their own privileges, advantages, and communal 
success at the expense of the “other” communities within 
the same society (Weber 1922, 52).
2 :e complete text of the Good Fri-
day Agreement can be found at: 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/
docs/agreement.htm.
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:e ethno-political strategy of total separation uses several 
tools or categories: sectarianism, a skeptical common sense, 
a strong focus on territoriality, a highly explosive poten-
tial of symbols and symbolism, and manifest collective 
traumata (Baumann 2008b). To understand the category 
of sectarianism in the context of post-con9ict societies we 
can go back to the sociologist Georg Simmel, a fellow of 
Max Weber, who used the concept of “socialization through 
con9ict” (Simmel 1958). :is comes close to what John Paul 
Lederach called the process of “Lebanonization” of society: 
“Cohesion and identity in contemporary con9ict tend to 
form within increasingly narrower lines than those that 
encompass national citizenship. In situations of armed 
con9ict, people seek security by identifying with something 
close to their experience and over which they have some 
control. In today’s settings that unity of identity may be a 
clan, ethnicity, religion, or geographic/ regional a?liation, 
or a mix of these” (Lederach 1997, 12f.).
:e =nal result is a post-war society in which any form of 
social interaction is determined by the “system” of sec-
tarianism: “Sectarianism is about what goes on in people’s 
hearts and minds, and it is about the kind of institutions 
and structures created in society. It is about people’s at-
titudes to one another, about what they do and say and the 
things they leave undone or unsaid. Moreover, ‘sectarian’ 
is usually a negative judgement that people make about 
someone else’s behaviour and rarely a label that they apply 
to themselves, their own sectarianism always being the 
hardest to see (Liechty and Clegg 2001, 102).
One of the most remarkable features of Northern Irish 
society is that even several centuries before the outbreak of 
violent con9ict in 1968, society as whole was sharply divided 
along religious lines. :ough Protestants and Catholics 
lived next to each other without violence, they did not live 
together with each other—and they had nothing to say to 
each other. :is was the =nding of Rosemary Harris’s eth-
nographic study conducted shortly aBer the Second World 
War: Catholics and Protestants had created two separate 
worlds, there was no social integration, even in mixed areas 
(Harris 1972, 146).
:is situation was characterized by Frank Wright as “com-
munal deterrence,” in which “serious communication” 
is not possible (Wright 1987, 1990, 1996). If there was any 
contact between Catholics and Protestants at all, if they 
passed each other on the streets for example, the division 
and “ethnopolitical separateness” was overplayed by what 
Harris called “over-friendliness”: they chatted about the 
weather, the high prices in the stores, etc. But the coping 
mechanism of “over-friendliness” prevented any serious 
dialogue on substantial matters: “People in Ulster are, as a 
rule, cheerful, courteous, and helpful to one another. :e 
deep political divisions of which I write, and on which the 
international media focuses so much attention, are avoided 
in daily conversations. It is considered to be rude to bring 
up issues of religious a?liations or anything that would 
re9ect these divisions. One never asks a person if he or she 
is Catholic or Protestant, for instance; it is simply not done” 
(Santino 2001, 61).
As a strategy for avoidance of dialogue, over-friendliness is 
still a common feature in today’s Northern Irish society. In 
2001—almost four years aBer the Good Friday Agreement 
and seven years aBer the cease=res—Peter Shirlow car-
ried out an ethnographic study of Protestant and Catholic 
interaction in North Belfast. His quite remarkable results 
gained a lot of attention, since his main =nding was that 
the features of “sectarianism” had not decreased during the 
peace process (Shirlow 2003). :is =nding was veri=ed in a 
later study he did together with Brendan Murtagh (Shirlow 
and Murtagh 2006).
:e most problematic feature of voluntary apartheid, and 
the one which is most resistant to change, however, is 
connected to the divided past and the existence in both 
communities of collective traumas based on con9icting 
collective memories. According to Maurice Halbwachs the 
memory of the individual is to a large degree determined 
by a collective foundation. In any society there are as many 
collective memories as existing (ethnopolitical) communi-
ties (Halbwachs 1966, 1967, 2002). Halbwachs emphasizes 
the enormous importance of the community as the primary 
context of communication and symbolic manifestation 
of memories of the past. :us, the act of remembering 
becomes a social practice. Halbwachs emphasizes that 
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memory has to be seen as social memory of the group or 
community: “:e group must have a memory of itself that 
recounts a sense of origin and distinctiveness. A social 
memory becomes a central facet of the ideological armoury 
of the group, helping to legitimise and rationalise di>erence 
by rooting it in the far-distant past and thus placing weight 
on the primordial and essential nature of the antagonists or 
otherness” (Halbwachs 1992, 6).
Because of the collective conditioning of memory, the 
simple act of remembering is not reduced to the individual’s 
own experience, but rather goes far beyond and encom-
passes the memories and experiences of people from his or 
her own community: stories and experiences that have been 
communicated. :us, remembering is an active as well as 
culturally-sensitive process since the collective memory has 
to be re-built and re-formulated on an ongoing basis: “So-
cial memories are not recollections of times past but part of 
the present understandings of the past, people use images 
of the past as a justi=cation for the present relationship and 
not ‘images from the past’” (Jarman 1997, 4>.).
Collective memories as “images from the past” for the pres-
ent have to be monitored, checked, and evaluated by the 
community on a regular basis in order to =t present (politi-
cal and/or strategic) purposes. As a consequence it is quite 
a common practice (memory practice) to delete speci=c 
historical events from the collective memory, while other 
events are mysti=ed or “de-contextualized,” i.e. removed 
from their concrete historical context (Jarman 1997, 7).
:is collective orientation towards remembering opens 
up opportunities for instrumentalization of past events 
with the aim of establishing and enforcing communal 
division through divided memories. :is makes them the 
crucial and most dangerous feature of voluntary apartheid: 
divided memories of the violent events of the past lead-
ing to con9icting moralities of violence. As a result violent 
“macro-events” can be either upgraded or downgraded 
arbitrarily—to serve to the needs of the community, i.e. the 
community’s collective memory. Vamik Volkan’s concept 
of “chosen traumas” helps us to illustrate this point in more 
detail: “I use the term chosen trauma to describe the collec-
tive memory of a calamity that once befell a group’s ances-
tors. It is, of course, more than a simple recollection; it is a 
shared mental representation of the event, which includes 
realistic information, fantasized expectations, intense feel-
ings, and defenses against unacceptable thoughts” (Volkan 
1997, 48).
Instead of “downgrading” the violent “macro-event” as a 
“chosen trauma,” it can alternatively be upgraded to become 
a “chosen glory” for the community’s collective memory 
(Volkan 1997, 81). :e prime example for the instrumental-
ization of “historical” violent events is the annual com-
memoration of Bloody Sunday (January 30, 1972), when 
fourteen Catholic civilians were killed by British paratroop-
ers (see below). :e fourteen people killed represent human 
loss and life-long tragedies for the families; there are many 
annual commemorative events, for example the Bloody 
Sunday march in Londonderry. But what is important to 
recognize is that the Catholic rationalization of the violent 
event, predominantly articulated by the IRA, perceives it as 
a “chosen glory” and not as a “chosen trauma.” :is became 
all too obvious in the year 2000 when Martin McGuin-
ness was the keynote speaker at the annual Bloody Sunday 
Memorial Lecture. Referring to the fourteen dead civilians, 
he said: “:ey are not victims. :ey are heroes” (I was in 
the audience during the speech). McGuinness used a clever 
semantic and symbolic trick of communication: while 
acknowledging the loss of the grieving families he also 
conveyed that for the IRA Bloody Sunday was by no means 
a “chosen trauma.” Before Bloody Sunday, the IRA was 
almost defeated, with only a handful of weapons leB and no 
signi=cant support within the Catholic community. :at 
changed dramatically in the aBermath of the killings, with 
a massive increase in support and volunteers: “:is aBer-
noon 27 people were shot in this city. 13 of them lay dead. 
:ey were innocent, we were there. :is is our Sharpeville. 
A moment of truth and a moment of shame. And I just 
want to say this to the British government: You know what 
you have just done, don’t you? You have destroyed the civil 
rights movement and you have given the IRA its biggest vic-
tory it will ever have. All over this city tonight, young man, 
boys will be joining the IRA.”
In the famous movie “Bloody Sunday” (2002) by Paul 
Greengrass, this statement was attributed to Ivan Cooper, 
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who was one of the leaders of the (nonviolent) human rights 
movement in Northern Ireland and also a member of the 
British House of Commons.3 In retrospect, Bloody Sunday 
destroyed the last chances of any peaceful settlement at that 
time. As a commemorative event, Bloody Sunday shows 
how active memory practice can rebuild and consolidate 
the voluntary apartheid at the communal level. However, 
“Bloody Sunday” is not remembered collectively by both 
communities. Rather, the Protestant collective memory 
chooses its own events to commemorate “its own victims,” 
like “Bloody Friday” (see below).
It can be concluded that the instrumentalization of the di-
vided past proves to be the key tool to uphold ethnopolitical 
separateness and division. It is far too early for the North-
ern Irish situation to be quali=ed as a “zone of stable peace” 
(Boulding 1978). 
Coming back to the political arena, it becomes very clear 
that the recently elected politicians are all too eager to 
ignore or leave the past behind (see the quote from Poots 
at the beginning). :eir macro-political strategy is one of 
“chosen amnesia” (the term was coined by Buckley-Zistel 
[2006]), because they want to move forward with politi-
cal consolidation of the process while ignoring the evident 
structures of voluntary apartheid. As Buckley-Zistel found 
out, a similar strategy was employed in Rwanda: “remem-
bering to forget” became the rationale of both communities. 
However, while this strategy might achieve some short-term 
rewards, it bears considerable long-term risk of a return to 
inter-ethnic violence because the structures that created the 
conditions for the outbreak of violence in the =rst place are 
not changed (Buckley-Zistel 2006).
3. Truth-Seeking Exercises and the Morality of Violence
3.1. The South African Model: “Truth” in  Exchange for Conditional Amnesty
During the past twenty-=ve years, truth commissions as 
a tool for political and social stabilization of post-con9ict 
societies have received increasing attention worldwide 
(Hayner 2000, 34). International interest in the idea of truth 
commissions grew even more in the 1990s in the wake of 
the South African and Chilean developments: “: e in-
creased interest in truth commissions is, in part, a re9ection 
of the limited success in judicial approaches to accountabil-
ity, and the obvious need for other measures to recognise 
past wrongs and confront, punish or reform those per-
sons and institutions that were responsible for violations” 
(Hayner 2000).
From the outset “Chile” and “Nuremberg,” were instru-
mental in the South African policy debate on the speci=c 
format and design of the TRC, because each represents an 
“extreme” type of “dealing with the past”: “If post-war Ger-
many represents one extreme of the justice policies pursued 
in transitional societies, namely prosecution, then Chile 
represents the other, namely, blanket amnesty for those 
who committed gross violations of human rights” (Simpson 
2002, 221).
It soon became very clear that “prosecuting everybody” was 
simply unworkable while trying to take over the apartheid 
state machine, whereas a “blanket amnesty” would be 
unacceptable to a black populace that had only just fought 
for and won the concessions that had resulted in negotia-
tions (Bell 2003; Villa-Vicencio 2000a, 2000b, 2003a). As 
a consequence, the South African policy-makers decided 
to go down the road Desmond Tutu called the “third way” 
between “Chile” and “Nuremberg.” :e TRC was o?cially 
commissioned to uncover “the truth” about apartheid’s hu-
man rights violations and to publicize its =ndings. :e TRC 
was made up of seventeen commissioners, selected from 
all political parties and groupings. ABer two years they 
presented their =nal report (for further description of the 
structure see Coetzee 2003 and Cherry, Daniel, and Fullard 
2003).
:e third way realized in the amnesty process gave the TRC 
far-reaching “semi-legal” authority and was the crucial 
3 Ivan Cooper himself gave his blessing to the 
movie: “‘I‘ve seen the =lm six times now,’ says Mr 
Cooper, now 58. ‘And my =rst thoughts were that it 
was an emotional experience. I‘m able to say with 
con=dence that it was made with great integrity.’ 
(…) ‘Before Bloody Sunday, I believe there were 
no more than 30 to 40 IRA volunteers in Derry. 
:ey had a very small base, small amounts of 
hardware and, most importantly, very little sup-
port.’” BBC News, January 30, 2002, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/1791090.stm.
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factor for which the TRC gained the most international 
recognition. :e South African version of amnesty was the 
central innovative feature of the TRC:
“Our amnesty process has been quite unique in the world. 
We have conditional amnesty. We would not have had all of 
these revelations if we had just gone for a blanket amnesty 
and families would still have been deprived of the knowl-
edge.” 4
Amnesty was only granted in exchange for “truth”: “Appli-
cants had to make a “full disclosure” of their human rights 
violations in order to qualify for amnesty. In most instances 
applicants would appear before the Amnesty Committee, 
and these hearings would be open to the public” (Boraine 
2003, 165).
:e bottom line was that the South African “invention” of 
amnesty was a limited version (Boraine 2003) termed “qual-
i=ed amnesty” (Villa-Vicencio 2003b). Granting amnesty 
was conditional upon the applicant (i.e. the perpetrator of 
violence) publicly stating the “truth” (Hayner 2000, 37). 
Within this hybrid “truth-seeking exercise” amnesty was 
inextricably linked with truth and reconciliation: “At the 
heart of this hybrid approach was the reliance on a notion 
of “truth recovery” as a restorative alternative to punitive 
justice—through full disclosure by perpetrators (and their 
supposed shaming) in exchange for amnesty, as well as 
through voluntary testimony about apartheid’s gross hu-
man rights violations given by victims (and their supposed 
healing)” (Simpson 2002, 221).
:e question of the “morality of violence” became rel-
evant in the context of the amnesty decision because in 
this hybrid version, amnesty was also conditional upon 
the political “quality” of the violent act committed by the 
amnesty applicant: in order to qualify for amnesty the act of 
violence had to be “justi=ed” as a politically motivated act of 
violence.
3.2. “Discriminatory Truth-seeking” in Northern Ireland
However, achieving the desired social consensus on the 
morality of violence is an uphill struggle. According to 
Brandon Hamber the challenge for post-con9ict societies is 
to be willing to adopt a totally di>erent moral starting point 
for the analysis or assessment of acts of violence in order to 
move forward: “Violence during times of political con9ict 
is by de=nition a political action fraught with the hidden 
hands of political agendas and posturing. It is for this very 
reason that consensual strategies for dealing with the past 
should be sought. It is only through taking control of the 
apparatus of memory and history that societies coming out 
of violence can begin to engage with and develop construc-
tive collective memories of the con9ict” (Hamber 1999b).
:e tension between morality, ethical considerations, and 
violence (or “performative acts” of “meaningful” violence) 
can be analyzed by critically questioning the communica-
tion, justi=cation, and legitimization strategies of violence. 
Acts of violence are embedded in an interpretative discourse 
that takes place within the communities whose perceptions 
are the central focal point; the communities’ perceptions 
are addressed, they become the target of the discursive 
process. :rough this process, violence becomes more and 
more self-driven and independent (Apter 1997, 10). Using 
the language of anthropologists, this argument is based 
on the assumption that politically motivated violence is 
presented as an intentional, calculated “performative act” 
(Aijmer 2000, 1) and, therefore, must be assessed according 
to its “performative quality.” :e same analytical backdrop 
is used by anthropologists like Anton Blok (2000) or Allen 
Feldman (1991, 1998) and by sociologists like David Apter 
(1997). :e important factor is to consider the meaning and 
signi=cance of the violent act instead of claiming a priori il-
legality, senselessness or irrationality: “Violence without an 
audience will still leave people dead, but is socially mean-
ingless. Violent acts are e?cient because of their staging of 
power and legitimacy, probably even more so than due to 
their actual physical results” (Schröder and Schmidt 2001, 
5f.).
4 Glenda Wildschut, in Long Night’s Journey Into 
Day, documentary =lm, 2000, transcript at: http://
www.newsreel.org/transcripts/longnight.htm.
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Seen within this framework violence by the IRA and others 
was directed against the “institutions” of the British crown 
and according to their “discourse processes” violent acts 
were not directed against the community, i.e. not against 
individual members of the Protestant community in North-
ern Ireland. :is point was reinforced in July 2002, when 
the IRA made a public apology to the “innocent victims,” 
namely to “non-combatants” killed during acts of “legiti-
mate” violence: “While it was not our intention to injure 
or kill non-combatants, the reality is that on this and on a 
number of other occasions, that was the consequence of our 
actions. . . . We o>er our sincere apologies and condolences 
to their families” (An Phoblacht, July 18, 2002).5
:us, the basic analytical assumption of this paper is that 
violence is a means of communication, disseminating (sym-
bolic) meaning which is open for interpretation: “Rather 
than de=ning violence a priori as senseless and irrational, 
we should consider it as a changing form of interaction and 
communication, as a historically developed cultural form of 
meaningful action” (Blok 2000, 24).
However, these discursive legitimization strategies cannot 
be leB unchallenged, because “recognition” and “under-
standing” are not a one-way street. :e challenge to the 
legitimization discourse is that during war there will always 
be civilian fatalities and combatants who decide to par-
ticipate in a war, i.e. choosing violence or armed con9ict, 
thereby accepting the loss of innocent civilian lives. :us 
when demanding that victims and surviving families 
understand the violent acts of armed groups as having been 
carried out for politically motivated reasons, the armed 
groups must in return also recognize how di?cult it is for 
victims and surviving families to comprehend the ration-
alization of violence that distinguishes between “legitimate 
targets” and “civilians.”
:e police is a prime example illustrating this point. Mem-
bers of Northern Ireland’s then overwhelmingly Protestant 
police force were seen as “legitimate targets” because they 
were the manifest institutions of British “foreign rule” in 
Ireland. But the moral challenge to such legitimization 
strategies is this: a police o?cer was not only a “military” 
servant of the state, but also “o> duty” a private citizen, a 
family man, a father, and a civilian. And he even might not 
even have supported the government he was serving under. 
So for a large part of his life he was indeed a “non-combat-
ant.” Only through the eyes of the IRA can he be seen as a 
legitimate target.
On the other hand we can also take the con9icting morali-
ties of violence one step further and ask critical questions 
from a completely contrary point of view: are there reasons 
or “rationalizations” that could persuade survivors whose 
relatives fell victim to violent acts “perpetrated” by the IRA 
and others that the armed groups and their families can be 
recognized as victims, too? Or in other words, is it feasible 
or justi=ed to classify armed combatants not only as “ter-
rorists” or “perpetrators,” but also as “victims”?
To understand this point we need to take a look at the biog-
raphies of the individuals involved in violence and the cir-
cumstances and living conditions of their families. Not only 
did they serve very long prison sentences, but their families 
were destroyed, “innocent” lives were ruined. In addition, 
many family members who had no IRA connection were 
murdered. “Civilian” family members of the armed groups 
were drawn into the civil war and many of them were 
killed. One example out of many is Tommy McKearney, a 
former IRA member who served seventeen years in prison. 
All three of his brothers were murdered, none them mem-
bers of the IRA, and Tommy himself almost died during the 
famous IRA hunger strike of 1980. Tommy and his family 
can thus be quali=ed as “victims” of the Northern Ireland 
con9ict. When asked in an interview, “Was it all worth it?” 
he replied: “I am by no means a philosopher, but I can only 
answer this question philosophically. I played all the cards 
which were dealt to me. I have no problem with my past. 
Sure, it caused a lot of pain for me and my family” (Tages-
zeitung, July 30, 2005).
5 Complete text: BBC News, July 16, 2002, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/2132113.stm.
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:e di?cult debate on the linkage and relationships 
between violence, legitimization, and morality ultimately 
leads to the conclusion that every attempt to compare or 
quantify individual or communal su>ering is doomed to 
fail: “:e whole process becomes unfortunate if you start to 
compare su>ering” (Villa-Vicencio 2003b).
In the reality of post-con9ict societies, communities keep 
being torn apart with each side claiming to be the “real” 
and “legitimate” victims, thereby belittling the other side’s 
su>ering. :e social-psychological feature of voluntary 
apartheid (see above) reinforces the di>erence between 
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” (“real” and “unreal”) victims 
as the predominant societal viewpoint: the members of 
one’s own community who lost their lives through violence 
are regarded as victims whereas the members of the “other” 
group are not accepted as such.
How do we get societies to a point where they are ready to 
understand and even accept the other side’s su>ering and 
start to abandon cognitive hierarchies of victimhood? :e 
political dimension of the reconciliation process is espe-
cially signi=cant in this case. If the exclusive de=nitions of 
victims prevailing in society are not overcome, the success 
of the political con9ict transformation process will also be 
constrained for a long time. :us, the political consolida-
tion of the Northern Irish peace process might soon prove 
to be temporary if the divided past resulting in a divided 
society is leB unresolved (voluntary apartheid).
4. Speech Acts Not Speaking for Themselves
4.1. Innocence of a “Guilty Victim” or Guilt of an “Innocent Victim”
Brandon Hamber made it clear that Northern Irish soci-
ety must engage in the challenge of resolving the divided 
past by analyzing and engaging with the “moralities of 
violence,” although it is questionable whether a consensus 
can ever be reached (Hamber 1999a). :e perceptions and 
rationalizations of violence on both sides face each other 
quite irreconcilably. One symbolic example illustrating the 
lack of understanding and recognition for the Republican 
discourse on violence in the broader Protestant community 
occurred when a new mural was formally inaugurated in 
January 2004. :e mural portrays = ve major IRA bomb at-
tacks that struck the Protestant community of the Shankill 
Road area in West Belfast (in one, the Shankill Road bomb-
ing of October 23, 1993, nine Protestants and one of the 
IRA men carrying the bomb lost their lives in the attack on 
Frizzel’s =sh shop). :e mural includes two straightforward 
messages from the Protestant community for the IRA and 
the British government: “No Military Targets, No Economic 
Targets, No Legitimate Targets” and “Where are our inqui-
ries? Where is our truth? Where is our justice?”
Two declarations by the IRA can be seen as responses to 
the Protestant claim, epitomized by the mural, that their 
victims are “forgotten” and not recognized in the same 
way as Catholic victims. First, the public apology of July 16, 
2002 (quoted above), which was hailed as a “historic” step 
internationally. Yet, as that apology was made only with re-
spect to “non-combatants,” it implies that the IRA’s military 
targets—institutions and symbols of the British state—were 
legitimate and therefore required no apology. :e second 
“historic” IRA statement, issued on July 28, 2005, followed 
the same ideological pattern. :e organization announced 
the end of its armed campaign, but at the same time stated 
that the armed struggle had been legitimate: “We are very 
mindful of the sacri=ces of our patriotic dead, those who 
went to jail, volunteers, their families and the wider repub-
lican base. We reiterate our view that the armed struggle 
was entirely legitimate. We are conscious that many people 
su>ered in the con9ict. :ere is a compelling imperative on 
all sides to build a just and lasting peace.”6
Protestant Mural on the Shankill Road, © CAIN (cain.ulst.ac.uk).
6 Irish Republican Army (IRA) State-
ment on the Ending of the Armed Cam-
paign, July 28, 2005, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/
othelem/organ/ira/ira280705.htm.
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:e reactions of the victims re9ect the ambiguity and 
contradictions of the quali=ed IRA apology, which was not 
received positively by the Protestant community: “While 
apologies such as this are easy to formulate, where is their 
declaration that the war is over, that they were not justi=ed 
in their use of violence and will never resort to it again—or 
do they continue to believe that they were justi=ed and wish 
to hold the option of returning to murder to further their 
ends if the ballot box ceases to deliver.”7
FAIR is an advocacy and lobby group acting for IRA 
victims and their families. Aileen Quinton, who lost her 
mother in the Enniskillen bombing, reacted to the IRA’s 
declaration of July 28, 2005, in a similarly negative way: 
“Why should I be grateful to the IRA for stopping doing 
what they’d no right to do in the =rst place? You shouldn’t 
get brownie points for not murdering people” (Sunday 
Tribune, July 31, 2005).
:ere have been some more positive reactions on the other 
hand. Alan McBride, who lost his wife in the Shankill Road 
bombing, said: “You have to recognise the fact that the IRA 
have not gone this far before. I do welcome it from that per-
spective. But I would urge caution. Words are not enough 
and this needs to be backed up by action. Having said that, 
it could be the start. If they are true to their words this 
could breathe some much needed air back into the peace 
process, which has been sadly lacking of late” (Guardian, 
July 29, 2005).
But by and large the prevailing conditions of Northern Ire-
land’s post-con9ict society are those of voluntary apartheid, 
where there is a strong perception of “one-sided victim-
hood” and a moral competition for primary “victim status”: 
“A political culture that is based on competing claims to 
victim-hood is likely to support and legitimise violence, and 
unlikely to foster an atmosphere of political responsibility 
and maturity” (Smyth 1999).
From the perspective of the victims and surviving relatives, 
the following critical questions arise with respect to the vio-
lence discourse of the non-state actors in war: Is it possible 
to distinguish at all between civilians and non-civilians, be-
tween civilian victims and military victims? It is a di?cult 
task to explain to the family of a murdered RUC policeman 
that their dead father was not a civilian. But in return, the 
state forces, the police and the army, must also ask them-
selves the critical question: How do you explain to a mother 
of a twelve-year-old child killed by a police plastic bullet, 
that the police was not a part of the “occupation force,” not a 
“legitimate target”?
:e search for answers to these di?cult questions can be 
facilitated by focusing on the “needs” of the con9icting par-
ties as a starting point for a con9ict transformation pro-
cess (see section 1.). :e various concepts focusing on the 
“needs” of the con9icting parties (Burton 1987, 1990, 1995; 
Burton and Dukes 1990; Kelman 1990, 1997a, 1997b; Kel-
man and Cohen 1976; Rosenberg 2003a, 2003b, 2004.) lead 
us to conclude that all victims of the civil war in Northern 
Ireland have the same need, namely recognition of their suf-
fering. For this reason, all victims of violence must be given 
equal status in the sense of an “inclusive de=nition of the 
victims.” However, if everybody becomes a victim the value 
of the category becomes questionable: indeed, the category 
of “victimhood” becomes almost irrelevant. So it makes 
more sense to talk about “lost lives” instead of applying the 
contentious concept of “victims” versus “perpetrators.”
4.2. Moralities of Violence: Lives Lost Are Lives Lost?
Northern Ireland is still far away from a consensus on how 
to assess the victims of the ethno-political con9ict; inclusive 
and exclusive de=nitions and perceptions of “victimhood” 
collide, while the exclusive de=nition is clearly predominant 
at societal level.
:e political attitude of Sinn Fein pretends to be based 
on an inclusive de=nition of the victims. Eoin O’Broin, a 
party spokesman, describes a memorial plaque in front of 
the Wave Trauma Center in North Belfast, which lists all 
the people who lost their lives in the con9ict in this area 
since 1969: “OBen the IRA volunteer’s name or the British 
7 Families Acting for their Innocent Rela-
tives (FAIR), press release, July 16, 2002.
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soldier’s name who is on the list was responsible for some-
body else’s life whose name is also on the list. . . . If we are 
going to have a real process of reconciliation, a real process 
of truth, at some level we have to acknowledge, whatever 
our political judgements: Lives lost were lives lost! And all 
of those people’s grief has to have some sort of equality” 
(O’Broin 2002).
Although it is o?cial Sinn Fein policy to approve a truth 
and reconciliation commission, the party recognizes that 
society is not yet ready to think in inclusive victim catego-
ries (O’Broin 2002). Nor should we forget that Sinn Fein 
is totally opposed to any form of amnesty for the “state 
forces,” i.e. the police and the British Army. In their eyes the 
British “crown forces” were not legitimate actors of violence.
If the dilemma of con9icting moralities of violence is to 
be resolved and a social consensus of inclusive “under-
standing” of victimhood achieved, the di?cult question 
of amnesty must be addressed. :ere are very clear signals 
coming from all armed groups that they would be ready to 
contribute to clearing up the 1,800 deaths still unresolved— 
depending on whether or not amnesty would be given 
in exchange for this act of clari=cation. Michael Stone, a 
former combatant of the Protestant Ulster Defence Asso-
ciation (UDA), made the connection with South Africa in 
an interview with Tim Sebastian on BBC Hardtalk (June 
11, 2003), emphasizing that he would be ready to make his 
knowledge public if he were guaranteed amnesty.
:e central problem for the implementation of any ver-
sion of a “Northern Ireland TRC” is connected to what 
was called the danger of “discriminatory truth-seeking” 
(Moltmann 2002, 43f.). :e danger of “discriminatory 
truth-seeking” is linked to the question of amnesty. :e 
Protestant mural cited earlier is a vehement example of 
“discriminatory truth-seeking”: “Where are our inquiries? 
Where is our truth? Where is our justice?”
Bernhard Moltmann made the very strong accusation of 
“discriminatory truth-seeking” against the Bloody Sunday 
Inquiry (also called the Saville Inquiry), which was set up 
by Tony Blair in January 1998 to =nd out the “truth” about 
the events of January 30, 1972, when fourteen Catholic civil-
ians were shot dead by British paratroopers.8 Presided over 
by Judge Lord Saville of Newdigate, the inquiry has heard 
almost one thousand witnesses over the years, but has still 
not published a =nal report. :roughout the life-time of 
the inquiry serious criticism has been directed against it, 
for example because of the total costs of about £150 million 
(Guardian, March 29, 2004). But the central point of criti-
cism was that the victims of Bloody Sunday came exclu-
sively from the Catholic community. :ere are increasing 
demands for IRA attacks resulting in the loss of hundreds 
of Protestant lives to be investigated with the same atten-
tion and the same =nancial investment as the events of 
Bloody Sunday. :ose making that case usually refer to the 
Enniskillen bombing, and to “Bloody Friday” in Belfast, 
when the IRA exploded twenty-six bombs on July 21, 1971. 
If the request for an inclusive de=nition of victims is taken 
seriously, then the needs of the Protestant victims and their 
families cannot be ignored.
5. Conclusion: Understanding, Recognition and (Critical) “Self-Analysis”
The only thing I can imagine that is more painful 
than self-analysis is child-birth. Why is it that we 
hate people we don’t know? How is it that we can 
live with ghosts and myths and shibboleths whilst 
having no credibility whatsoever or foundation to 
our touchstones of what passes for political policy 
or political philosophy? And of course: Is that a 
political philosophy at all? (Ervine 2001)
David Ervine was a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force 
(UVF), a Protestant paramilitary group and chief enemy 
of the IRA. He served almost ten years in prison before be-
coming the leader of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 
and an outspoken supporter of the peace process. Northern 
Irish society as a whole still has extensive “self-analysis” 
to cope with, because if there is any consensus at all in 
Northern Ireland, it is the negative or skeptical “common 
sense” that Northern Ireland is not ready for the truth of the 
8 Website: http://www.bloody-
sunday-inquiry.org.uk.
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violent past. A positive sign might be the overarching con-
sensus within Northern Irish society that the past cannot be 
leB “untouched” and that is has to be dealt with, but there is 
no plausible agreement on how to do this (Hamber 1999a).
What is important, however, is that post-war societies like 
Northern Ireland can never be transformed into Aldous 
Huxley’s “Island” or a pre-modern “Ladakh.” Post-war so-
cieties will never be free of con9ict, since new con9icts will 
arise in the future. :e right “peace prescription” can only 
cure a society of its divided past, heal its memories, and 
reassert a society’s capacity to establish common institu-
tions for peaceful con9ict management. In order to reach 
this capacity the sociological concept of “recognition” is 
a helpful tool. In his ground-breaking study, the German 
philosopher Axel Honneth argued that “the struggle for 
recognition” is, and should be, at the center of social con-
9icts (Honneth 1996, see the comments in the introduction). 
Putting the “journey” towards mutual “recognition” by so-
ciety as a whole at the center of the con9ict puts the concept 
at the center of the transformation of the con9ict, too. :e 
debate that followed Honneth’s publication is quite illustra-
tive. Honneth’s philosophical considerations were strongly 
challenged by Nancy Fraser, who criticized that within 
the philosophical debate there was too much emphasis on 
“recognition” while the important questions surrounding 
the idea of “redistribution” were marginalized (Honneth 
and Fraser 2003). Leaving aside the Honneth-Fraser debate, 
mutual recognition comes into play as a “soB factor” within 
the realm of con9ict transformation and acquires an enor-
mous potential for post-con9ict societies since it can lead to 
a weakening of voluntary apartheid. :e main focus must 
be on mutual recognition of victimhood while acknowledg-
ing the su>ering and loss on both sides.
One impressive example of recognition occurred in May 
2007, when Sir Mike Jackson, who was an o?cer in the 
Parachute Regiment in Londonderry at the time of Bloody 
Sunday, said: “I have no doubt that innocent people were 
shot.”9 Jackson had previously consistently refused to give 
evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.
Another example is the proposals of the Consultative Group 
on the Past, an independent group established in 2007 to 
seek views across the community on the best way to deal 
with the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland. :e group, 
co-chaired by Lord Robin Eames, the former archbishop 
of Armagh and Primate of All Ireland, and Denis Bradley, 
a prominent public =gure and former vice-chairman of 
the Police Board, published its =nal report on 28 January 
2009. Most controversially it included the proposal that a 
payment of 12,000 pounds should be made to all who lost 
relatives as a result of the troubles: civilians and members of 
the non-state groups (Consultative Group on the Past 2009). 
:e Consultative Group characterized this payment as 
“recognition payment” aimed at recognizing that everybody 
who died as consequence of the Troubles was a legitimate 
victim. Unsurprisingly, a storm of anger followed. For ex-
ample, Lord Morrow from the DUP argued that “mothers’ 
tears are not the same”: “:e question has been asked, ‘Are 
the tears of the mother of a paramilitary killer any di>erent 
from the tears of the mother of a victim who had no in-
volvement whatsoever in violence?’ I happen to think there 
is a di>erence, in particular, when that mother declares 
her support for the murderous activities her o>spring was 
engaged in” (+e Newsletter, February 3, 2009).
Even before publication, the Consultative Group made a 
similarly controversial proposal which was excluded from 
the =nal report: On January 8, 2008, it proposed that the 
British government should formally declare and “recognize” 
that it had fought a “war” against the IRA. :roughout the 
“Troubles” successive governments and the security forces 
claimed they were dealing with “criminal activity” and a 
“breakdown of law and order” in Northern Ireland. Declar-
ing that a “war” had been fought would give some moral 
and ethical legitimacy to the “fallen comrades” of the IRA, 
who would then be considered as “victims of war”—on an 
equal basis with police o?cers and soldiers.
Willie Frazer responded very angrily to the proposal: “If 
there was a war it justi=es the murder of our loved ones. 
It was not a war, it was a terrorist campaign” (BBC News, 
9 BBC News, May 29, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/6699729.stm..
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January 8, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_
ireland/7176271.stm). However, Jude Whyte, whose mother 
was killed by a UVF bomb, was quoted as saying that it 
was important to move forward: “What Denis Bradley and 
Robin Eames are doing is asking people together to cross 
the rubicon and forgive, not to forget, but to hand the next 
generation something better” (ibid.).
In order to cross that rubicon, the =rst step is the mutual 
recognition of victimhood. :is should be the institutional 
basis of any Northern Ireland commission dealing with the 
past.
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